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Abstract 
This article aims to identify factors which influence public awareness of health or economic harm 
from pollution in China. Based on an analysis of the China General Social Survey (CGSS) carried 
out nationwide by Renmin University and HKUST in 2006, it focuses on awareness of pollution-
related harm or self-identification as a pollution victim. The analysis tests three groups of 
hypotheses about how self-identified victims differ from others: first, in terms of the environmental 
conditions they experience, such as the actual level of pollution and types of neighbourhoods they 
inhabit; second, in terms of resources including material and information resources, time, social 
capital and political experience; and third, in terms of political attitudes. The conclusion discusses 
implications for the politics of public participation in environmental governance in China. 
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Introduction   
There have been a great many studies from a variety of disciplinary perspectives looking at 
issues of environmental justice in China, including some looking at the distribution of pollution,1 but 
relatively few that look at awareness of pollution as a problem2.  The extant survey-based studies 
tend to show that awareness of different kinds of pollution is high3 but most of these are content 
with reporting distributions, without analysing the data in depth or offering any hypotheses to 
explain awareness4.  There are few studies which problematize awareness of harm from pollution. 
Awareness of harm is important from a theoretical perspective since the literature on dispute 
resolution describes the process of developing grievances in terms of a so-called ―dispute 
pyramid‖ with three steps: naming, blaming and claiming5. The first step involves becoming aware 
of the seriousness of an injury, the second involves attributing it to the actions of someone else 
and the third step involves use of voice, addressed either at the person blamed or a third party. 
This description encourages us to examine awareness of and action against pollution as parts of a 
segmented process, in which the first step is self-identification as a pollution victim.  Within the 
context of Chinese social science research, there have been a number of successful studies of the 
blaming and claiming part of this process6, but no one, to this author‘s knowledge, has yet looked 
                                                 
1
  Recent examples include E. D. Schoolman and C. B. Ma, "Migration, Class and Environmental Inequality: Exposure 
to Pollution in China's Jiangsu Province," Ecological Economics 75(2012), pp.140-51. L. Liu, "Environmental Poverty, 
a Decomposed Environmental Kuznets Curve, and Alternatives: Sustainability Lessons from China," Ecological 
Economics 73(2012), pp.86-92; P. L. Xue and W. H. Zeng, "Trends of Environmental Accidents and Impact Factors in 
China," Frontiers of Environmental Science & Engineering in China 5, no. 2 (2011), pp.266-76; C. B. Ma, "Who Bears 
the Environmental Burden in China-an Analysis of the Distribution of Industrial Pollution Sources?," Ecological 
Economics 69, no. 9 (2010), pp.1869-76. 
2
 One survey-based study looked at the relationship between pollution and wellbeing – see Russell Smyth et al., "A 
Study of the Impact of Environmental Surroundings on Personal Well-Being in Urban China Using a Multi-Item Well-
Being Indicator," Population & Environment 32, no. 4 (2011), pp.353-75. For a variety of social scientific perspectives 
on the environment and health, see the special edition of Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 19, no.63 (2010). 
3
 For example, across eight different types of pollution, a median of 73 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that 
pollution was a serious problem in Guangzhou according to a survey with 916 respondents carried out in five urban 
districts in October 1996. See Carlos Wing Hung Lo and Sai Wing Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion 
in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance," China Quarterly 163(2000), p.688. 
For similar results see also Koon-Kwai Wong, "Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese 
Characteristics," Asia-Pacific Review 12, no. 2 (2005), pp.39-57; Paul G. Harris, "Environmental Perspectives and 
Behavior in China," Environment and Behavior 38, no. 1 (2006), pp.5-21..  
4
 A five-city survey in Liaoning with 5,996 respondents attempted a corporatist approach to sample design, producing 
six sub-samples representing residents, policy-makers, teachers, students, staff of industrial enterprises, and farmers. 
Whilst confirming that concern about pollution is widespread, it found only one important difference between the 
groups in levels of concern – students were more concerned about global climate change compared to the other 
groups. See Peijun Li, Frank Stagnitti, and Zongqiang Gong et al., "Environmental Quality: Issues and Causes of 
Deterioration - a Survey on Environmental Awareness among the Public in Liaoning Province, China," International 
Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 16, no. 3 (2009)., p.146.  
5
 William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming," Law & Society Review 15, no. 3/4 (1981), pp.631-54 
6
 Kathinka Fürst, "Access to Justice in Environmental Disputes : Opportunities and Obstacles for Chinese Pollution 
Victims," (University Of Oslo, 2008); Rachel E. Stern, "From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China," China 
Quarterly 206(2011), pp.294-312; Benjamin van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action 
against Pollution in China," Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 63 (2010), pp.55-77 
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at the naming part, that is the process by which people become aware of pollution as a problem 
from an egocentric viewpoint. There is a need to understand this process in order to judge the 
public‘s capacity to become a significant actor in pollution control.   
This article offers a study of the characteristics of self-identified pollution victims based on a 
nationally representative sample. The section below describes the data and research design and 
explains the measure of self-identification. Section three develops hypotheses  to explain the 
distribution.  Section four presents bivariate analysis and a multi-level logistic regression to test the 
hypotheses. The conclusion reviews some of the limitations of the study and the data on which it is 
based, and speculates about the implications of the analysis for understanding the politics of 
public participation in environmental governance in China. 
Data and Measures  
This study is based on analysis of data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS), carried 
out nationwide from September to November 20067 by Renmin University and the Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology8. The survey took place in 969 tertiary sampling units 
including 559 urban neighbourhoods and 410 administrative villages using stratified proportionate 
to population probability sampling across 28 provinces of mainland China. The tertiary sampling 
units were randomly selected from settlement lists compiled for the 2000 census. Where there 
were significant changes in neighbourhood or village boundaries, population movements or 
changes in administrative status between the census and the date of survey, the area sampled 
was adjusted to reflect as closely as possible the situation as of the 2000 census. Within each 
settlement, individual households were selected by proceeding on a random route, with the aim of 
achieving a quota of ten households per sampling unit. The result was a sample with a total of 
10,151 respondents, one of the largest publicly available opinion surveys in China. Ten per cent of 
the sample classified themselves as migrant workers or migrant business people (wailai gong, 
wailai jingshangren). 
CGSS asked respondents whether they had experienced any harm to their health or livelihood 
from pollution over the past year (Table 1). Just over six per cent of respondents believed they or 
their family members had suffered harm. It is important to emphasize that the measure is a 
subjective opinion. When we compare it to official statistics which for example report that in 2006, 
9.1% of 559 cities surveyed failed to meet even the lowest Grade III air quality, and 28% of 745 
                                                 
7
 CGSS has also made available the 2003, 2005 and 2008 surveys, but these do not include the dependent variable 
analysed here. 
8
 Lulu Li and Yanjie Bian, "China General Social Survey 2006," (Beijing: National Survey Research Centre at Renmin 
University of China, 2006). CGSS is sponsored by the China Social Science Foundation. The author appreciates the 
assistance in providing the data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned, but all views expressed here are the 
author‘s own. 
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river sections failed to meet even the lowest Grade V water quality9, it is clear that the number of 
people who actually suffer harm from pollution could be much greater than just six per cent. Some 
of these may have not noticed the harm--for example health damage which has not yet revealed 
symptoms or economic costs which are borne above the household level.  Some may have 
noticed harm but not attributed it to pollution. There may also be ―false claimants‖ to victimhood, 
whose subjective response to pollution is out of proportion to the actual harm they suffered. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Hypotheses  
Studies of environmental management in China acknowledge that there have been some 
spectacular improvements in urban amenity and significant attempts at mitigating the level of 
pollution which has resulted from China‘s transformation into a major industrial power, but many 
are also critical of the way in environmental risks have been unevenly distributed. Tu and Shi10, for 
example, noted that Shanghai‘s approach to sewerage management during the 1990s and early 
2000s involved displacing the problem by diverting it into the Yangtze Estuary and East China 
Sea, raising significant issues of geographic and intergenerational inequity. Dasgupta and 
Wheeler11 found using provincial-level data over 1987 to 1993 that the number of environmental 
complaints per 10,000 inhabitants was a function of the density of airborne dust emissions, but not 
sulphur dioxide emissions nor water born chemical oxygen demand, and reasoned that this was 
because dust is visible in a way that the other pollution is not.  Brettell12 used separate data for 
water and air pollution complaints over the period 1990 to 2004 to show that total industrial 
wastewater effluent and sulphur dioxide emissions partially explain an increase in the respective 
types of complaints. If complaints have an objective basis, then it is reasonable to hypothesise that 
self-identified pollution victims live in more polluted environments than others (H1a).  The same 
studies also showed associations, controlling for pollution indicators, between environmental 
complaints at the aggregate level and the wealth of a city or region, whether measured as real 
consumption per capita13 or GDP per capita14, as well as between complaints and education as 
                                                 
9
 MEP, "State of the Environment 2006," (Beijing: Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2006). 
10
 W. Tu and C. Shi, "Urban Environmental Management in Shanghai: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects," 
Environmental Management 37, no. 3 (2006), p.315. These authors see intergenerational, geographic, procedural and 
interspecies equity as the key to sustainable development, and argue that the general public is the ―fundamental force 
in driving the course of sustainable urban development‖ (p.319).   
11
 S. Dasgupta and D. Wheeler, "Citizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators: Evidence from China," World Bank 
Policy Research Working Papers, no. 1704 (1997), p.13, 21 
12
 Anna Brettell, "Channelling Dissent: The Institutionalization of Environmental Complaint Resolution," in China's 
Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social Movement, ed. Peter Ho and Richard L. Edmonds 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.122 
13
 Dasgupta and Wheeler, "Citizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators: Evidence from China", p.21 
14
 Brettell, "Channelling Dissent: The Institutionalization of Environmental Complaint Resolution", p.122. We should be 
cautious about how this relationship plays out at the level of particular communities. EPB officials informed Zhang that 
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measured by provincial literacy rates.    Dasgupta and Wheeler interpret these data as indicating 
―elasticity of demand for environmental quality.‖15 . Since income and education vary more 
between individuals and households than between regions, using individual-level survey data, we 
can improve upon the accuracy of these results. Of more interest than simply replicating the 
aggregate-level studies is to consider whether there are other ―ecological‖ effects on self-
identification as a pollution victim which are not captured by official pollution statistics. In this 
study, we consider three such effects. One is the general effect of level of development, as 
measured by GDP per capita, which we hypothesise may decrease the number of self-identified 
pollution victims owing to better environmental management (H1b). The second is the effect of the 
population size of nearby cities, which we hypothesise may increase the number of pollution 
victims, since larger populations may generate other forms of pollution which are not captured by 
official statistics (H1c).  The third is the type of area the respondent inhabits. Conventionally, areas 
are often divided between urban and rural administrative jurisdictions, but CGSS offers a more 
detailed variable -- type of neighbourhood (shequ leixing). We hypothesise that this variable 
matters because cities and counties – the typical units of aggregate-level analysis -- are 
geographic spaces which are structured internally. Our general expectation is that people in less 
desirable neighbourhood types are more likely to self-identify as pollution victims (H1d). 
The concept of elasticity of demand raises the question of how subjective factors may influence 
self-identification as a pollution victim. Both Liberal and Marxist traditions emphasize the role of 
scarcity in driving forward economic and social development, and in the contemporary discourse 
of sustainable development, this includes the scarcity of environmental amenity16. Hirschman17 
observed in mid-twentieth century America that complaints about the impact of environmental 
changes on quality of life were  most forthcoming amongst those who already enjoyed a high level 
of amenity. Johnson‘s18 case studies of NIMBY resistance to the construction of a paraxylene 
plants in Xiamen and a waste incinerator in Beijing, seemed to involve people from all walks of life 
— not just the relatively well off. In other words, concerns about impacts on health and property 
prices were widely shared. However, in Xiamen, the outcomes of the protests included, after a 
two-day public hearing to deliberate on a strategic environmental impact assessment, a decision 
to relocate the plant to the nearby city of Zhangzhou, where presumably there was less likelihood 
                                                                                                                                                                                
in the context of the green bounty programme in Fuyang City, many of the informants were farmers, and very few 
were whistle blowers from within enterprises. See Xuehua Zhang, "Green Bounty Hunters: Engaging Chinese Citizens 
in Local Environmental Enforcement," China Environment Series, no. 11 (2011), p.147. 
15
 Dasgupta and Wheeler, "Citizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators: Evidence from China", p.11 
16
 P. Tijmes and R. Luijf, "The Sustainability of Our Common Future - an Inquiry into the Foundations of an Ideology," 
Technology in Society 17, no. 3 (1995), p.335 
17
 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p.53 
18
 T. Johnson, "Environmentalism and Nimbyism in China: Promoting a Rules-Based Approach to Public 
Participation," Environmental Politics 19, no. 3 (2010), pp.440ff 
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of protest19. In Beijing, a mass petition facilitated the suspension of the waste incineration project, 
centred on the Liulitun area of Haidian district, which is home to China‘s top universities.  The 
general notion we are interested in testing is that people with greater resources may have higher 
levels of awareness of the harm caused by pollution because they have higher expectations of 
environmental amenity. We can make this into a set of falsifiable hypotheses by considering the 
relationship between awareness of harm and different types of resources. These include not only 
material resources, but also such factors as time, social capital including both horizontal and 
vertical ties, informational resources such as knowledge and cognitive ability, and political 
experiences which ―raise consciousness‖20.  
Alford et al.21 found in a sample consisting mainly of Anhui farmers a positive correlation 
between environmental awareness and household wealth. If there is a class dimension to self-
identification as a pollution victim, we should expect to find income and/or assets matter even 
when other relevant variables are controlled  (H2a). People with time on their hands may be more 
likely to worry about the environment, and so develop a sense of anxiety about pollution. A study 
of public participation in public policy-making in Chengdu found that people in their twenties and 
the over-sixties were more likely to participate in public policy-making than people in their thirties, 
forties and fifties, married people were less likely to participate than unmarried people, and 
married people with children were least likely of all to participate22. If having time on your hands 
matters, we would expect that young people and those who are retired are more likely to  self-
identify as pollutions victims (H2b). 
Similarly, people who have a larger stock of social capital may develop a shared sense of 
grievance through social interaction. Again, awareness of harm and action against pollution are 
not the same thing, and most prior studies have focussed on the latter. Zhu and Ho23 noted that 
the preservation of neighbourhood ties when residents of an old part of Shanghai moved en 
masse into new apartments in the ―Green Garden‖ neighbourhood helped initiate and sustain an 
effective campaign against later attempts to build on park land near their new apartments. 
Jennings24 found that having a second occupation was a positive predictor of engaging in 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p.441. In 2010, average annual wages for urban employees in Zhangzhou were 26 per cent lower than in 
Xiamen. See National & Fujian Province Bureaux of Statistics, Fujian Tongji Nianjian 2011 [Fujian Statistical Yearbook 
2011). (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2011), p.565 
20
 van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China.", p.63f 
21
 William P. Alford et al., "The Human Dimensions of Pollution Policy Implementation: Air Quality in Rural China," 
Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 32 (2002), p.505 
22
 Chunmei Li, "Chengzhen Jumin Gongzhong Canyu Yu Taidu Shizheng Yanjiu--Yi Chengdu Shi Wei Li [Empirical 
Research on Urban Residents Public Participation and Attitudes--Chengdu as an Example]," Journal of China National 
School of Administration 5(2006), p.69. Unfortunately, this article does not give full details of the survey. 
23
 Jiangang Zhu and Peter Ho, "Not against the State, Just Protecting Residents' Interests: An Urban Movement in a 
Shanghai Neighbourhood," in China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social Movement, ed. 
Peter Ho and Richard L. Edmonds (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.167 
24
 M. Kent Jennings, "Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 
(1997), p.369 
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demanding forms of political participation. We can test the notion that people with a larger stock of 
social capital are more likely to self-identify as pollution victims (H2c). 
Political experience may serve to ―raise consciousness‖ about environmental issues. In the 
Green Garden dispute in Shanghai, residents specifically sought out an individual with experience 
in dealing with neighbourhood conflicts to be their spokesman25. Unusual political skill was a 
requirement for the job, and the activities organized by this person subsequently ―raised 
consciousness‖ and the will to fight of many others in the neighbourhood. A striking feature of the 
case-study literature is how local attempts to influence policy implementation, especially in rural 
areas can escalate, involving larger numbers of people in contentious discussions and in collective 
action, sometimes inside the boundaries of legality and sometimes transgressing them26.  As 
O‘Brien and Li observe, ―Direct tactics can help a group of activists to expand their base by 
creating solidarity, forging a collective identity, and strengthening trust.‖27 We can test the 
hypothesis that political experience encourages people to self-identify as pollution victims (H2d). 
Finally, we would expect information resources, including knowledge and cognitive ability, to 
increase awareness of environmental risks.  Using individual-level data from their survey in rural 
Anhui, Alford et al.28 found that education was a significant positive influence on environmental 
awareness. Dasgupta and Wheeler29 found that the provincial literacy rate was a significant 
influence on environmental complaints. Alongside education, we should consider the effects of 
media exposure. In Fuyang city, Zhang30 reports, polluting enterprises were even more nervous 
about the effects of hostile media reports than about EPB fines. We should bear in mind that not 
all education is formal or takes the form of consumption of media. Jing31 documents how Dachuan 
village underwent a ―cognitive revolution‖ about pollution after watching domesticated animals go 
blind, having the problem of stillbirths highlighted by population policies and health worker visits, 
and seeing fish ponds poisoned.  Nevertheless, this kind of intensive, direct experience of pollution 
is probably unusual. Our general expectation is that those who have more education and higher 
media exposure are more likely to self-identify as pollution victims (H2e). 
It is widely recognized in public opinion research that people make use of cognitive shortcuts to 
form opinions about unfamiliar issues quickly without necessarily making an effort to acquire 
                                                 
25
 Zhu and Ho, "Not against the State, Just Protecting Residents' Interests: An Urban Movement in a Shanghai 
Neighbourhood", p.156 
26
 Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Jun Jing, "Environmental Protests in Rural China," in Chinese Society : Change, Conflict and Resistance ed. 
Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2010); Johnson, "Environmentalism and Nimbyism in 
China: Promoting a Rules-Based Approach to Public Participation." 
27
 O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, p.85 
28
 Alford et al., "The Human Dimensions of Pollution Policy Implementation: Air Quality in Rural China", p.505 
29
 Dasgupta and Wheeler, "Citizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators: Evidence from China", p.21 
30
 Zhang, "Green Bounty Hunters: Engaging Chinese Citizens in Local Environmental Enforcement", p.150 
31
 Jing, "Environmental Protests in Rural China", p.199ff 
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information which would allow them to base their opinion on evidence32.  This kind of ―prejudice‖ 
may lead to the association of particular political attitudes with self-identification as a pollution 
victim. When Fuyang city was considering introducing a green bounty programme, officials held a 
debate in which concern for the environment was pitted against the ―growth first‖ mentality and 
some officials‘ fear of upsetting local enterprises33. We can hypothesise that general concern with 
green issues or with the environment makes people more sensitive to environmental risk and more 
likely to identify as pollution victims (H3a).  
Inglehart‘s attempt to theorize patterns of value change posits the spread of ―post-modern‖ 
values34, referring to support for equality and greater tolerance of diversity. Wang Zhengxu 
deployed an analysis of data from seven countries in the Asia Barometer survey of 2006 to argue 
first, that post-modern values tend to be more widespread in more economically developed 
Confucian societies like Japan and Hong Kong, and less widespread in less developed Confucian 
societies like China and Vietnam; and second, post-modern values in Confucian societies 
generally encourage people to be more active politically, more assertive of individual and political 
rights, more supportive of democracy and, notably, more supportive of greater government 
attention to environmental policy35.  Whilst the data analysed in this study do not allow a 
replication of the post-modern values measures used by Wang, we can test the general notion that 
those who are supportive of social and political equality are “sensitized” to environmental issues 
and hence more likely to self-identify as pollution victims (H3b). 
We do not need to accept the Inglehart theory of post-modern value change in order to see a 
connection between concerns about equality and the environment. Jing‘s36 case study of Gaoyang 
village illustrates how distributional and political issues can become tied up with environmental 
conflict. There people lost their land as a result of the Three Gorges dam project and were 
inadequately compensated through the allocation of terraces which were not fit for farming. The 
environmental issue (the Three Gorges dam) was effectively obscured by the issue over land, 
questions about the legitimacy of local authorities accused of misusing land reclamation funds, 
and the ideological imperative not to oppose a major national project.  The direct experience of 
unfair treatment may create a generalized sense of grievance which is another possible source of 
self-identification as a pollution victim (H3c).  
                                                 
32
 John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
33
 Zhang, "Green Bounty Hunters: Engaging Chinese Citizens in Local Environmental Enforcement", p.148 
34
 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
1990); ———, Modernization and Postmodernization Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).. Inglehart has explicitly linked his theory to support for environmental 
protection. See ———, "Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 
Societies," PS: Political Science and Politics 28, no. 1 (1995), pp.57-72 
35
 Zhengxu Wang, "Postmodern Values in Seven Confucian Societies: Political Consequences of Changing World 
Views," Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 3 (2007), p.348, p.355f.  
36
 Jing, "Environmental Protests in Rural China.", p.201ff 
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Studies in a wide variety of developed and transitional countries suggest that critical citizens 
impose on governments higher standards of performance, which make it harder for them to earn 
popular trust37.  In South Korea, for example, the factors which influence trust in government 
include government performance in dealing with environmental problems38 as well as living up to 
democratic ideals39.  In China, survey-based studies have shown that, against the background of a 
generally high level of political trust, citizens with higher education tend to be more critical and 
those with more intense media exposure less critical of government40. Some researchers argue 
that social welfare and the supply of public goods are coming to replace economic development as 
important sources of political trust41.  It is not unknown for local governments to conceal 
information about major pollution incidents in order to avoid public criticism42.  To the extent that 
government media controls constitute an effective tool for manipulating public perceptions, and 
given that trust to some extent varies independently of education levels, we would expect that one 
of the consequences of a high level of trust in official information sources would be a lower 
propensity to self-identify as a pollution victim (H3d). 
Explaining Self-Identification as a Pollution Victim  
Multinomial logistic regression is the appropriate tool for analysing the explanatory power of 
multiple independent variables for a binomial dependent variable. This technique estimates the 
association of the independent variables with the ratio of the odds that a respondent belongs to 
one category rather than another.  The variant used here is a multi-level logistic regression 
analysis43 with the independent variables tested as a block and included in the model on the basis 
of likelihood ratio tests (P<.15). The limited geographical scope of the official environmental data 
means that the analysis has to be based on a subsample of 751 sampling points, including 74 per 
cent of the cases in the full sample, clustered by the city holding jurisdiction including outlying rural 
                                                 
37
 Pippa Norris, "Conclusions: The Growth of Critical Citizens and Its Consequences," in Critical Citizens: Global 
Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); P. 
Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
38
 Soonhee Kim, "Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter?," 
Public Administration Review 70, no. 5 (2010), p.807 
39
 Richard Rose, Doh C. Shin, and Neil Munro, "Tension between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: The Korean 
Example," in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
40
 J.J. Kennedy, "Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the 
State-Controlled Media," Political Studies 57, no. 3 (2009), p.527 
41
 T. G. Meng, "Government Governance and Political Trust in Transition China: An Empirical Analysis," Proceedings 
of 2009 International Conference on Public Administration (5th), Vol II (2009). 
42
 For example, Harbin bore the brunt of a November 2005 benzene pollution disaster, which it took the authorities ten 
days to acknowledge publicly. See Robert Marquand, "Chinese Decry Toxic Cover-up," Christian Science Monitor 98, 
no. 2 (2005), pp.1-11. 
43
 Using the Bernoulli model specification included in the HLM 6 programme. See Stephen W. Raudenbush and 
Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2002), chapter 10 for details of the procedure. 
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areas44.  Areas under the jurisdiction of smaller cities and remote areas are excluded because no 
data is available on environmental conditions there45. The analysis also excludes one city where 
an exceptionally high level of awareness was found for the level of pollution46.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The model shows that in line with expectations about the effects of pollution on popular 
consciousness (H1a, H1c) the total volume of industrial waste water per capita is a significant 
predictor of self-identification as pollution victim (T=2.64**, Table 2) as is the size of the population 
of the city with jurisdiction (T=2.60*), but contrary to our expectation that, controlling for the 
amount of pollution, level of development would reduce the number of self-identified victims (H1b), 
GDP per capita is not significant. Chi-squared tests of alternative models confirm that, first, there 
is significant variation between cities, as shown by the fact that the variance of the intercept in the 
model with no city-level predictors is significantly different from zero (bottom panel, Table 2), and 
second, industrial waste water per capita (but not the other pollution indicators) and population 
size do significantly improve the model fit. The fact that city-level measures are statistically 
significant justifies the use of a multi-level model.  
At the household level, the type of neighbourhood in which the respondent lives stands as a 
proxy for local environmental conditions which cannot be captured by statistics applying to a whole 
city. Consistent with our expectation that people in less desirable areas would be more likely 
victims (H1d), every type of area apart from professional and high-end housing is more likely than 
the reference category of ―ordinary commercial housing‖ to include residents who self-identify as 
pollution victims.  People on rural plains (T=4.68***), in housing built for workers of industrial 
enterprises (T=4.00***), and in mountainous areas (T=3.20***) within a particular city‘s jurisdiction 
are amongst the most likely to be aware of environmental harm. We should bear in mind that the 
rural respondents included in the analysis are those living within the jurisdiction of a city, not all 
rural respondents. 
Measures of resources such as income and the estimated value of housing, social capital, 
political experience, and information resources (knowledge and cognitive ability) were all tested 
                                                 
44 For descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the model plus basic demographics and city-level pollution 
statistics see the Appendix. A longer list of all variables tested is available from the author. 
45
 As a check on whether the reduced sample behaves differently to the full sample, a separate logistic regression 
model was developed using the full sample without the city-level indicators. The model confirms the findings reported 
here with minor variations: details available from the author.  For a comparison of descriptive statistics of the full 
sample with the reduced sample, see Appendix. 
46
 In the northern city of Harbin, 93% of respondents identified as pollution victims, even though the industrial waste 
water statistic of 3.4 tonnes per capita is on the low side. Since influential cases can bias statistical analysis, the 
decision was made to exclude Harbin (88 cases). The formal procedure used to identify Harbin as having 
exceptionally high self-identification as a victim for its actual level of pollution was the Box-Tidwell test, detailed in 
Scott W. Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, 2002). pp.69-71. 
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systematically for inclusion in the model. Most failed the tests, but in line with our hypothesis about 
political experience (H2d), having witnessed collective action is a highly significant positive 
influence (T=7.15***).  One information measure (H2e), the number of books in the house when 
the respondent was 18, was also significant (T=2.75**), whereas the highest educational level 
reached was not.   
In line with the green values hypothesis (H3a), the view that global environmental problems are 
serious is a significant positive influence (T=5.86***) and the importance of the local environment 
as a spending priority is marginally significant (T=2.25*). In terms of general concern with social 
and political equality (H3b), the view that the poor are poor because they lack education is 
significant (T=3.08**), and one other attitude—the view that rich-poor conflicts are serious-- 
passes likelihood ratio tests for inclusion in the model but the coefficient is not significant at the .05 
level.  In line with the generalized grievance hypothesis (H3c), the experience of being unfairly 
treated in civil, political or economic disputes is highly significant (T=8.18**). The measure of trust 
in government information, which we expected to reduce self-identification as a victim (H3d), 
passes likelihood ratio tests for inclusion in the model but the coefficient has a large standard 
error, and so the hypothesis is not confirmed.  
We can quantify the impact of a standard deviation increase in the value of the independent 
variables and convert the resulting logged odds into probabilities to simulate substantive impacts 
(Figure 1).  Such a procedure shows that environmental conditions at city level including 
aggregate pollution levels and population pressure have minimal impact on the likelihood of an 
individual self-identifying as a pollution victim. The reason for this is that the coefficients, although 
statistically significant, are small in magnitude. Environmental conditions at neighbourhood level 
have a much larger substantive impact. For example, living on a rural plain, which has the largest 
coefficient amongst neighbourhood types, more than doubles the likelihood of self-identifying as a 
victim of pollution from just fewer than two per cent to just under four per cent47.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Political experience and information resources are amongst the best predictors of self-
identification as a pollution victim. Having witnessed collective action doubles the probability again 
to just over seven per cent. The number of books in the house when the respondent was eighteen 
adds another three per cent. 
                                                 
47
 The interpretation of a one standard deviation increase is not straightforward in the case of ordinal and dummy 
variables, but it is useful as a standard unit because it reflects the fact that differences in variation exist amongst the 
independent variables. An alternative standard unit would be the change from minimum to maximum values, but this 
would not capture differences in variation. As in any simulation exercise, these results are intended indicate the 
substantive significance of the statistical relationships found. They are not equivalent to the probabilistic statements 
we would derive from the sample without doing any modelling. In fact, the survey shows that one is marginally more 
likely to be a pollution victim if one lives in an urban rather than a rural area, by a margin of 7 per cent to 5 per cent 
(P<.001).  
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Political attitudes add substantially to these effects.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
seriousness with which global environmental issues are viewed doubles the likelihood of self-
identifying as a pollution victim to 20 per cent. A generalized sense of grievance about unfair 
treatment adds five per cent.  The belief that the poor are poor because of their lack of education 
adds four per cent. Assigning importance to the local environment as a priority adds another three. 
The cumulative impact of increasing the values of all significant independent variables by one 
standard deviation is that the respondent has close to a one in three chance of self-identifying as a 
pollution victim.  
Conclusion  
An important limitation of this article is that it is based on only one cross-sectional survey. 
Follow-up studies, repeating the environmental module of questions used in 2006 would be 
required to confirm whether the picture presented here still holds true. Another limitation is that the 
contextual data on environmental pollution may be insufficiently fine-grained to capture the real 
impact of pollution on awareness of harm, and hence lead us to overstate the importance of 
subjective factors.  Nevertheless, the article is the first to profile self-identified pollution victims in 
China and in this way breaks new ground. 
Chapter 20 of China‘s Agenda 21 endorses the goal of increasing public participation in 
environmental governance48. Without involvement by the public, it will be difficult to restructure 
institutions to serve necessary ecological rationalities such as the circular economy, sustainability 
and stewardship of resources for future generations49. Traditional top-down controls are no longer 
seen as adequate to enforce even relatively straightforward regulations on the types and 
quantities of pollutants enterprises can emit50. At least part of the Chinese public appears to be 
ready to take on its new role. Between 1990 and 2006, the annual number of incidents giving rise 
to complaints to Environmental Protection Bureaux (EPBs) in China increased by 450 per cent 
from 111,359 to 612,12251. The increase in complaints reflected institutional adjustments by the 
Chinese authorities designed to encourage public participation in such forms as letters and visits 
(xinfang), use of national and local environmental hotlines, participation in EIA public hearings and 
water price setting, and, as a last resort, civil law suits against polluting enterprises52.  .   
                                                 
48
 Yuhong Zhao, "Public Participation in China‘s EIA Regime: Rhetoric or Reality?," Journal of Environmental Law 22, 
no. 1 (2010), p.94 
49
 Arthur P. J. Mol, "Environment and Modernity in Transitional China: Frontiers of Ecological Modernization," 
Development & Change 37, no. 1 (2006), p.30; Peter Christoff, "Ecological Modernisation, Ecological Modernities," 
Environmental Politics 5, no. 3 (1996), p.490 
50
 van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China", p.56 
51
 Brettell, "Channelling Dissent: The Institutionalization of Environmental Complaint Resolution", p.111 
52
 Carter and Mol, "China and the Environment: Domestic and Transnational Dynamics of a Future Hegemon", p.337. 
Brettell, "Channelling Dissent: The Institutionalization of Environmental Complaint Resolution", pp.123-132; Zhang, 
"Green Bounty Hunters: Engaging Chinese Citizens in Local Environmental Enforcement" p.143f; Zhao, "Public 
Participation in China‘s EIA Regime: Rhetoric or Reality?", p.91 
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However, it may behove us to retain a certain degree of scepticism about the capacity of the 
public to become the pivot on which China‘s developmental trajectory will turn. Case studies 
suggest Chinese pollution victims continue to face formidable institutional barriers to effective 
action including cost, slowness, lack of impartiality, corruption, legal and scientific complexity, lack 
of intermediary institutions, and physical distance; whilst the polluting enterprises, often closely 
connected to the local state, have an armoury of techniques at their disposal including stalling 
tactics, use of connections, buying off victims and, occasionally, rent-a-mob violence53. Moreover, 
even though there is a trend towards more frequent protests, including boycotts, demonstrations, 
collective law suits, collective petitions and coordinated internet activity, and some have been 
successful in achieving their goals54, it remains the case that protests are exceptional and 
successful ones even more so, due to the sharp inequalities in distribution of power which are 
characteristic of an authoritarian system55. 
To what extent can we rely on the dynamic between pollution and public response to generate 
the motivational structure to turn the environmental situation around?  The China General Social 
Survey of 2006 asked a series of follow-up questions of those respondents who self-identified as 
pollution victims56. First, CGSS asked whether pollution victims had taken any action on the most 
severe occasion57. Only a quarter had done so.  Amongst the types of action taken, contacting the 
polluter and contacting government departments were the two dominant strategies, each favoured 
by just over two-fifths of the pollution victims. Of the 169 who took action, 63 per cent were 
dissatisfied with the result, and the type of action taken seemed to make little difference58.  Only 
four per cent of victims said they went to the news media and only one per cent went to court. 
Engaging in these forums presents difficult challenges.59 The 495 respondents who self-identified 
as pollution victims but did not take any action were asked about their reasons for not doing so.  
                                                 
53
 van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China", p.58, 65, 67, 74 
54
  An MEP source put the number of such disputes at 51,000 in 2004 and 128,000 in 2005. See Tianjie Ma, 
"Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China," China Environment Series, no. 10 (2009), p.35.  In July 2012, protests 
in Shifang, Sichuan province, led officials to cancel plans to build one of the world‘s largest copper smelting plants. 
Other examples of protests leading to the cancellation, closure or relocation of factories include in 2011 a coal-fired 
power plant in Haimen, Guangdong province, a solar energy company in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province and a PX plant in 
Dalian;  in 2009 a waste incineration plant in Panyu, Guangdong province; in  2007 a PX plant in Xiamen; and in 2005 
chemical plants in Dongyang village, Zhejiang province. A litany of cases, however, does not prove that 
environmentalists are winning the struggle as there are many more cases where such a positive outcome did not 
occur, relocation does not necessarily improve the overall environmental effect, and there is often a long delay 
between announcement of a decision and actual closure. A detailed examination of mass incidents is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but for analysis see Ma, "Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China" and Jing, "Environmental 
Protests in Rural China". 
55
 Susan Martens, "Public Participation with Chinese Characteristics: Citizen Consumers in China's Environmental 
Management," Environmental Politics 15, no. 2 (2006), p.64f 
56
 Admittedly, we are on less certain ground here: instead of analysing, as above, a sample with thousands of cases, 
we are now looking at a subsample of 664. 
57
 The question was: (If suffered harm) In that case, on the occasion when you suffered most from pollution, did you 
take any action? 
58
 72 per cent of those who contacted the polluter were dissatisfied as against 63 per cent who contacted the 
government and 73 per cent of those who contacted both and 47 per cent of those who did neither. 
59
 van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China", p.70f, p.72f 
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The largest group, 43 per cent, said they had thought about it but knew it would be of no use. A 
smaller group, 11 per cent, said they had thought about it but decided it would be too much 
trouble, or the price would be too high.  Around a fifth (19 per cent) had thought about it, but didn‘t 
know what to do. Around the same number (22 per cent) said they hadn‘t thought about it, as they 
could put up with the problem, and the remaining few (4 per cent) gave other responses.  
If NIMBY protest and remonstrance with official institutions offer little hope of creating a 
motivational structure for effective action against pollution, what about NGOs? CGSS also asked 
the full sample of 10,151 about whether they had joined or would consider joining a self-organised 
(minjian) environmental protection group60. Less than one per cent of respondents said they had, 
but an enormous number, 62 per cent said ―Yes, I would like to in future if there is an opportunity,‖ 
18 per cent said they would not like to and 19 per cent weren‘t sure.  It is hard to interpret the fact 
that more than three fifths said they would like to join an NGO, but close analysis of these data 
suggests that as in the United States, willingness to join depends on a mixture of collective 
interests (personal and group efficacy combined with the value placed on the environment) and 
selective incentives (costs and benefits)61. This raises the question of whether altruistic, socio-
tropic or even nationalistic concern for the environment could replace the egocentric sense of 
victimhood as a motivating force.  In theory, it seems possible, and this would give ENGOs a 
powerful voice.  However, the authorities are sensitive to the dangers mass membership NGOs 
would present to the present regime62. With a few exceptions, existing ENGOs are generally 
unwilling to become involved in pollution disputes for fear of endangering their ―embedded‖ status, 
which depends on good relations with the local authorities63. 
Putting China‘s development path on a sustainable footing requires lowering the people‘s 
tolerance level for pollution and increasing their readiness to use voice to protect themselves, their 
                                                 
60
 The question was: Would you like to join an NGO engaged in environmental protection activities? Yes, and I have 
already done so; Yes, I would like to in future if there is an opportunity; No; Don’t know. 
61 
Neil Munro, "Polite Interest or Passion? Willingness to Join Green NGOs in China," in The 5th International Forum 
for Contemporary Chinese Studies (IFCCS5): "Contending Models for China’s Future Development: Society Building 
and Governance" (Beijing, 8-9 August 2012). 
62 By the end of 2005 there were 2768 registered environmental NGOs in China including only 202 which were self-
organised by members of the public according to Zhao, "Public Participation in China‘s EIA Regime: Rhetoric or 
Reality?", p.117. Membership size tends to be quite small. For a typology based on case studies, see Lei Xie, 
Environmental Activism in China (London: Routledge, 2009). For discussions of government regulation of ENGOs see 
Jonathan Schwartz, "Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits," Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (2004), pp.28-49. 
Peter Ho, "Sprouts of Environmentalism in China? Government-Organized NGOs and Green Organizations in 
Disguise," in Shades of Green: Environmental Activism around the Globe, ed. C. Mauch, N. Stoltzfus, and D. R. 
Weiner, pp.135-60 (Lanham and Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). Shui-Yan Tang and Xueyong Zhan, 
"Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratisation in China," Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 3 
(2008), pp.425-48. 
63 The leading environmental NGO in this area, the Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, restricts itself to 
providing legal advice and is only able to get directly involved in about one per cent of the complaints brought to it. 
Another NGO called Shouwang Jiayuan trains activists in water pollution disputes but faces pressure from the 
authorities, which has lead to the arrest of one of the core activists according to van Rooij, "The People Vs. Pollution: 
Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China", p.70, 73 
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livelihoods and their environment. As Economy64 puts it ―turning the environmental situation in 
China around will require something far more difficult than setting targets and spending money; it 
will require revolutionary bottom-up political and economic reforms.‖ Unfortunately, history shows 
that to succeed such reforms require their own ―inbuilt energy supply‖ – a motivational structure 
which makes their implementation seem logical and necessary to the majority of relevant actors 
pursuing their own interests. In a context where so few people are aware of the harm pollution 
causes to themselves, and where the regime is unwilling to allow a broader mobilization by civil 
society groups around environmental issues, it is difficult to see how such a motivational structure 
can come into being. 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Elizabeth C. Economy, "The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China's Environmental Crisis," 86(2007), p.39 
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Table 1. Self-Identification as a Pollution Victim in China 
QE40.In the past year, have you or members of your family suffered harm, either health-
related or of an economic nature, due to environmental pollution (including air pollution, 
water pollution, solid waste, noise etc.)? 
  %  N 
Yes 6 664 
No 94 9,847 
    
Source: China General Social Survey (CGSS), fieldwork 10 September to 29 November 
2006, N=10,151. 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical Model of Self-Identification as a Pollution Victim  
     Coefficient S.E. T-ratio P-value 
              City-level indicators             Intercept    -4.37 .22 -19.44 .000 
Industrial waste water per capita, tonnes .010 .004 2.64 .009 
Population of city with jurisdiction, millions .04 .01 2.60 .010 
GDP per capita, thousand yuan .002 .005 .44 .659 
              Neighbourhood types      
Rural plain 1.34 .29 4.68 .000 
Industrial enterprise danwei 1.08 .27 4.00 .000 
Mountain or plateau 1.01 .32 3.20 .002 
Recently developed rural land 1.05 .38 2.77 .006 
Affordable housing (jingji shiyong fang) .66 .30 2.19 .028 
Unreconstructed old city, shanty .62 .27 2.33 .020 
Ordinary commercial housing Omitted 
Professional danwei, high-end .44 .38 1.17 .242 
             Individual characteristics     
Has witnessed collective action 1.22 .15 8.18 .000 
Experience of unfair treatment .69 .10 7.15 .000 
Books in house at 18 .13 .05 2.75 .006 
Reads periodicals, newspapers .05 .03 1.39 .164 
Global environmental problems serious .53 .09 5.86 .000 
Poor are poor because lack education .24 .08 3.08 .002 
Local environment an important priority .11 .05 2.25 .025 
Rich vs. poor conflicts are serious .12 .07 1.81 .071 
Trusts government information  -.11 .06 -1.75 .079 
     
    Chi-squared Tests of Alternative Models     
                                                    Variance of  
Model                                              Intercept 
Reduction 
 in error 
Chi-
square 
DF P 
A. No city-level predictors .88 -- 890.56 737 .000 
B. Add waste water per capita  .87 1% 881.28 736 .000 
C. Add population of city .83 6% 854.08 735 .002 
D. Add GDP per capita .83 6% 853.81 734 .002 
A-D Reject A .05 (6%) 36.75 3 .000 
B-D Reject B .04 (5%) 27.47 2 .000 
C-D Consider C .00 0% .27 1 .671 
     Note: Variance of intercept=Variance of logged odds that respondent was aware of 
environmental harm when all predictors have zero effects; Chi-square=test statistic for 
hypothesis that variance of intercept=0; DF=degrees of freedom; P=Probability that the 
Chi-square is due to chance (reject if P<.15) 
Source: China General Social Survey (CGSS), fieldwork 10 September to 29 November 
2006, Sub-sample under jurisdiction of cities at prefecture level and above,  N =7,550 
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Figure 1. Impacts on the probability of self-identification as a pollution victim 
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Source: Hierarchical model of awareness of environmental harm: areas under the jurisdiction of 
cities at prefecture-level and above (Table 2). Change in Probability shows the impact on the 
probability of identifying oneself as a pollution victim of a one standard deviation change in the 
value of the independent variables significant at .05 level. 
Probability of self-identifying as a victim 
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Appendix. Variables Tested in Multivariate Models 
   Full sample Table 2 
Dependent Variable Min. Max. Mean Stdev
. 
Mean  Stdev
. Self-identifies as pollution victim 0 no 1 yes .06 .23 .05 .22
     City-level environmental indicators  
Industrial waste water per capita 1.77 tonnes 112.08 tonnes Na  20.59 18.37 
Population of city  .84 million 32.35 million Na  6.26 4.29 
GDP per capita, thousand yuan 5.89 84.10 Na  30.20 21.26 
Density of SO2, tonnes/sq. km .26 57.48 Na  11.62 13.35 
Airborne dust, tonnes/sq. km .17 13.56 Na  2.93 2.75 
    Neighbourhood types       
Rural plain 0 No 1 Yes .19 .40 .23 .42 
Affordable housing 0 No 1 Yes .08 .27 .09 .28 
Mountain or plateau 0 No 1 Yes .22 .41 .22 .41 
Industrial enterprise danwei 0 No 1 Yes .12 .32 .11 .31 
Unreconstructed old city, shanty 0 No 1 Yes .14 .35 .13 .33 
Professional danwei, high-end 0 No 1 Yes .06 .23 .05 .23 
Recently developed rural land 0 No 1 Yes .04 .19 .02 .16 
Ordinary commercial housing 0 No 1 Yes .16 .36 .14 .35 
    Individual characteristics  
Has witnessed collective action1 0 No 1 Yes .10 .31 .09 .29 
Experience of unfair treatment2 0 Never 2 Twice+  .14 .44 .13 .42 
Books in house at 18 1 None 6 100+ 2.05 1.26 2.09 1.27 
Reads periodicals, newspapers 1 Never 7 Daily 3.95 2.51 4.04 2.52 
Global environmental problems 
  serious 
1 Not at all  5 Very serious 3.75 .81 3.75 .82 
Poor are poor because they lack 
   education 
1 Totally 
  disagree 
4 Totally agree 2.75 .80 2.73 .81 
Local environment an important 
  priority 
0 Not at all 3 Very  
 important 
.69 1.12 .68 1.12 
Rich vs. poor conflicts serious 1 Not at all 4 Very  2.64 .90 2.65 .91 
Trusts government information 1 Least 5 Most  3.87 .86 3.86 .87 
    Social structural characteristics       
Gender 0 Male 1 Female .54 .50 .54 .50 
Education 1 Primary- 4 University 2.14 1.00 2.17 1.01 
Age: 20s 0 No 1 Yes .20 .40 .20 .40 
Age: 30s 0 No 1 Yes .24 .42 .22 .42 
Age: 40s 0 No 1 Yes .24 .42 .24 .43 
Age: 50s: 0 No 1 Yes .20 .40 .21 .41 
Age: 60+ 0 No 1 Yes .13 .34 .13 .34 
Annual h‘hold income ‗000 RMB 0 None 100+ 21.14 19.24 21.72 20.02 
Residence permit: rural 0 No 1 Yes .49  .50 .51 .50 
Residence permit: full urban 0 No 1 Yes .48 .50 .46 .50 
Source: CGSS data in Tables 2-5. Contextual variables from National Bureau of Statistics. 2008 
China City Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2008, Table 2-42 
1. Including collective boycotts of unreasonable fees, collective resistance to land requisitioning or 
relocation, collective participation in environmental protection activities, collective gathering of 
signatures, negotiating, appeals, petitions, lawsuits, meetings, marches, demonstrations etc. 
2. Unfairness in nine categories: property disputes, land requisition, urban sprawl, enterprise 
restructuring, losing a job, distribution of land for housing, grassroots elections, allocation of work 
responsibilities, other. 
 
